

YEAR 1970
STAMP

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(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

GUARD

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Contents checked
for transfer to
D.R.O.

Ray P. McKenna

Date 2/2/71

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

DEPT.
or POST

NEAR EASTERN

(-7)

FILE No. NE J 14/54 (Part)

TITLE: TRAINING BY H.M.G. OF POLICE FORCE
OF JORDAN.

REFER TO

REFER TO

REFER TO

NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE
Registry c.w.l.	①	17/11						
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YEAR STAMP

970

[illegible]

NEXT FILE: NEJ 141

CONFIDENTIAL GUARD

CYPHER CAT/A

SECURITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 898

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

13 NOVEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL 130915Z

GUARD.

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pr. un
17/11

NEJ 14/11
NES 14/11

PRINCE HASSAN SUMMONED A MEMBER OF MY STAFF ON 6 NOVEMBER AND AFTER SAYING THAT HE SPOKE WITH THE KING'S EXPRESS AUTHORITY ASKED FOR H.M.G.'S URGENT ASSISTANCE IN BRINGING THE JORDAN POLICE FORCES UP TO A STATE COMMENSURATE WITH CURRENT PROBLEMS AND ESPECIALLY WITH THE NEED FOR THEM TO TAKE OVER CONTROL OF AMMAN. THE KING WAS MOST ANXIOUS TO SUBSTITUTE AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE POLICE METHODS FOR MILITARY ONES, BY WHICH HE EVIDENTLY MEANS PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF DISTURBANCES AND DISTURBERS OF THE PEACE BY MORE PATIENCE, SKILL AND MODERATE MEANS THAN THE ARMY HERE ARE TRAINED TO EMPLOY. UNFORTUNATELY THE EXISTING POLICE FORCE WERE STILL GEARED TO THE RELATIVELY PEACEFUL DAYS BEFORE JUNE 1967 AND NEEDED DRASTIC REFORM. ALTHOUGH THE KING HAD AT FIRST INTENDED TO SEEK AMERICAN ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE HE HAD ON REFLECTION DECIDED THAT BRITAIN'S LONG UNDERSTANDING WITH JORDAN AND GREATER EXPERIENCE OF OPERATIONS RANGING FROM MALAYA TO NORTHERN IRELAND MADE HER A BETTER SOURCE OF ADVICE. THE AMERICANS WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE ASKED TO HELP TECHNICALLY AND WITH SUPERVISION OF MATERIAL AID.

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3. TO THIS END HE WOULD LIKE TO INVITE A SENIOR ADVISER TO BE CHOSEN AT AN APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL BY H.M.G. TO VISIT AMMAN PRIVATELY, LOOK OVER THE CITY, FAMILIARISE HIMSELF WITH ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSS SUITABLE MEASURES WITH THE KING AND OTHERS IN A POSITION TO PUT THEM INTO EFFECT. THE KING HOPED THAT THIS OFFICER COULD THEN PRIVATELY RECOMMEND TO HIM HOW THE FORCE SHOULD /BE

CONFIDENTIAL GUARD

BE ORGANISED AND BY WHOM, AND ADVISE ON THE POSITION, TERMS OF REFERENCE AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF THOSE ENTRUSTED WITH THE TASK. THE SENIOR VISITOR SHOULD HIMSELF STAY AS LONG AS HE THOUGHT NECESSARY BUT ESSENTIALLY HIS VISIT WOULD BE A SHORT FACT-FINDING OPERATION TO PAVE THE WAY FOR REFORM AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, LEADING HE HOPED TO BRITISH HELP WITH TRAINING PROGRAMMES AT A LATER STAGE.

4. IT WAS MADE CLEAR THROUGHOUT THAT THE KING'S PURPOSE IN ALL THIS WAS TO INCULCATE MODERATION AND THE IDEA OF MINIMUM FORCE. THE HANDLING OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM AND METHODS OF ARMY/POLICE COOPERATION EVOLVED THERE AGAINST A POLITICAL BACKGROUND WERE REGARDED AS A GOOD BASIS FOR CONSIDERING HOW TO COPE WITH JORDAN'S PROBLEM. AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS CLEAR FROM PRINCE HASSAN'S COMMENTS THAT HE FELT THAT THE REPUTATION OF BRITISH POLICE FOR MODERATION WOULD IN ITSELF HELP, THROUGH THE REQUEST FOR RESIDENT ADVISERS, TO CREATE A PUBLIC IMPRESSION THAT FAIR PLAY WAS INTENDED BY THE GOVERNMENT.

5. I AM ENTIRELY IN FAVOUR OF HELPING THE KING TO GET A BETTER POLICE FORCE, SOMETHING BETWEEN THE EXISTING CIVIL POLICE WHO DISAPPEAR AS IF BY MAGIC AS SOON AS A CAR BACKFIRES, AND THE TRIGGER-HAPPY SOLDIERS WHO DO NOT WAIT TO FIRE BACK BUT SHOOT FIRST. AT THE SAME TIME, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE POLICE SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH THE FEDAYEEN MILITIA WITHOUT HAVING TO CALL IN THE ARMY (SOMETHING WHICH IS ANYHOW PRECLUDED BY THE TERMS OF THE CAIRO AND AMMAN AGREEMENTS), THIS COULD BE A SENSITIVE FIELD IN WHICH TO EMPLOY RESIDENT OUTSIDE ADVISERS. A CONDITION, THEREFORE OF GIVING OUR ADVICE AND, IT MAY BE, OF SUPERVISING ITS TRANSLATION INTO ACTION, SHOULD BE THE ABILITY (SINCE THE OPERATION IS BOUND TO BECOME KNOWN) TO GET IT ACROSS TO PALESTINIANS AS WELL AS OTHER ARABS ELSEWHERE THAT THE OBJECT OF THE EXERCISE IS TO MITIGATE UNNECESSARY "FEDAYEEN BASHING" RATHER THAN SIMPLY INCREASE POLICE EFFECTIVENESS IN DOING IT. ANOTHER POINT TO BEAR IN MIND IS THAT WHILE I SEE EVERY ADVANTAGE IN GENEROUS PROVISION BEING MADE FOR TRAINING JORDANIAN POLICE IN BRITAIN, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL THAT ANY ADVISERS WE PROVIDED TO WORK HERE WOULD HAVE TO BE OF A BACKGROUND AND STATURE WHICH WOULD MINIMISE THE RISK THAT THEY AND BRITAIN IN GENERAL WOULD BE BLAMED EVERY TIME A POLICEMAN USED EXCESSIVE FORCE (SOMETHING THAT HAPPENS IN LESS VOLATILE POPULATIONS THAN THE ARABS).

/6.

6. THE FUTURE STABILITY OF THE COUNTRY WILL DEPEND CRITICALLY ON KEEPING THE ARMED FORCES OF BOTH SIDES APART AND THIS IMPLIES A STRONG AND EFFECTIVE POLICE FORCE TO HOLD THE RING. IT FOLLOWS THEREFORE THAT WHILE THE ABOVE ARE CONSIDERATIONS TO BE BORNE IN MIND BY OURSELVES AND BY WHOEVER MAY BE APPOINTED TO ADVISE, THEY ARE NOT AN ARGUMENT AGAINST HELPING OR FOR DELAY AND I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT URGENT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO A PRIVATE VISIT ON THE LINES REQUESTED. I SUGGEST THAT BOTH AS A GESTURE AND ALSO AS A PROPER USE OF SUCH MONIES WE MIGHT FINANCE IT FROM THE COUNTER-SUBVERSION FUND. AS TO THE PERSON OR PERSONS TO BE INVITED, IT OCCURS TO ME THAT IF HE WERE NOW FREE FROM HIS COMMITMENTS IN THE GULF SIR GAWAIN BELL, WHO HAS SERVED BOTH IN PALESTINE AND JORDAN BESIDES BEING A FLUENT ARABIST AND FRIEND OF THE FORMER AMIR ABDULLAH, MIGHT BE A GOOD CHOICE PROVIDED HE WERE ACCOMPANIED BY A HIGH-RANKING PROFESSIONAL POLICE OFFICER TO PROVIDE UP TO DATE TECHNICAL ADVICE.

MR. PHILLIPS

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

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ARABIAN D.
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AMERICAN D.
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CONFIDENTIAL GUARD

PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO AMMAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 553

17 NOVEMBER 1973
(HE)

CONFIDENTIAL 171710Z.

GUARD.

19/14

YOUR TELNO. 898: POLICE ADVISER FOR JORDAN.

WE AGREE THAT THIS REQUEST SHOULD BE MET AND DISCUSSED IT AT A MEETING TODAY.

2. POSSIBLE CANDIDATES INCLUDE, IN PROVISIONAL ORDER OF PREFERENCE, SIR RICHARD CATLING (EX INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE IN KENYA, WITH PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN MALAYA AND PALESTINE, WHERE HE WAS HEAD OF THE SPECIAL BRANCH): SIR KERR BOVELL (EX INSPECTOR-GENERAL IN NIGERIA), AND MR. E.C. EATES (EX POLICE COMMISSIONER, HONG KONG). WE DO NOT, REPEAT NOT, THINK SIR G. BELL COULD FIND TIME FOR THIS EXTRA COMMITMENT. ANY OF THE THREE OFFICERS MENTIONED ABOVE COULD, IF AVAILABLE, UNDERTAKE A REVIEW COVERING ALL THE SUBJECTS IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF YOUR PARAGRAPH 2.

3. SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS, WE SHOULD LIKE TO INTRODUCE THE PREFERRED CANDIDATE TO KING HUSSEIN DURING HIS VISIT TO LONDON AT THE END OF THE MONTH, I.E. BEFORE SENDING HIM TO JORDAN FOR AN EXPLORATORY VISIT OF UP TO TWO WEEKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER. THIS CAN BE FINANCED FROM THE COUNTER SUBVERSION FUND.

4. WE TAKE IT THAT THE CONSIDERATIONS IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM ABOUT EXPLAINING AWAY THE PRESENCE AND TASKS OF UNDERLINE NEXT WORD RESIDENT OUTSIDE ADVISERS TO THE PALESTINIANS DO NOT ARISE AT THIS STAGE, AND THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE WITH JORDANIAN HELP TO PLAY DOWN ANY SPECULATION WHICH AN EXPLORATORY VISIT MIGHT AROUSE.

/5.

CONFIDENTIAL GUARD

CONFIDENTIAL GUARD

- 2 -

5. WE SHALL BRIEF THE SELECTED CANDIDATE ON POSSIBILITIES OF TRAINING IN THE UK FOR JORDANIAN POLICEMEN (YOUR PARAGRAPH 5). IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO BE ABLE TO BRIEF HIM ON THE PRESENT STRENGTH, DISPOSITIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF THE JORDANIAN POLICE FORCE, PARTICULARLY IN AMMAN. CAN YOU SEND US A BRIEF REPORT ON THIS BY BAG, INCLUDING SPECIAL BRANCH ACTIVITIES?

DOUGLAS-HOME

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COPIES TO: MR. F.T. COPELAND
COUNTER SUBVERSION
COMMITTEE,
ROOM 812,
RIVERWALK HOUSE.

CONFIDENTIAL GUARD

NET 14/4

TOP COPY (S)

CLAIR.

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 563

TO AMMAN.
19 NOVEMBER 1970.

(NE)

UNCLASSIFIED. 191500Z.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 553. (2) /POLICE ADVISER/

GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENT BY FIRST THING TOMORROW FRIDAY SO THAT
WE CAN SOUND OUT THE POSSIBLE CANDIDATES.

P^ru
24/11

DOUGLAS-HOME

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- O.P.A.
- P.U.S.D.
- DEFENCE DEPT.
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COPY TO:

MR. F.T. COPELAND, CSC, R.812
RIVERWALK HOUSE.

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NET 14/4

4

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CYPHER CAT/A
IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 918

TO F.C.O.
20 NOVEMBER 1970

pm
24/4

CONFIDENTIAL.
201015Z
GUARD.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 563 (RECEIVED TODAY) POLICE ADVISER FOR JORDAN

PRINCE HASSAN SEEMED PARTICULARLY PLEASED WHEN INFORMED OF YOUR OFFER. AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION WITH THE KING IN THE COURSE OF THE AUDIENCE, MY FIRST SECRETARY WAS TOLD THAT THE KING PARTICULARLY LIKED YOUR IDEA THAT HE SHOULD MEET CANDIDATES IN LONDON DURING HIS VISIT. ON PARTICULARS SUPPLIED SIR RICHARD CATLING SEEMED THE OBVIOUS CHOICE. IF POSSIBLE HE WOULD, HOWEVER, LIKE TO MEET THE OTHER TWO BEFORE MAKING HIS MIND UP. IN THE MEAN TIME THE BRIEF CALLED FOR IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 5 ON THE STRENGTH, DISPOSITION AND CAPABILITIES OF THE JORDANIAN POLICE FORCE WILL BE DRAWN UP AND TAKEN TO LONDON BY THE KING FOR YOUR USE IN BRIEFING.

2. ON PRESENT FORM IT STILL APPEARS TO BE THE KING'S INTENTION TO LEAVE FOR LONDON ON 26 OR 27 NOVEMBER. I AM SEEKING AN AUDIENCE FOR TOMORROW 21 NOVEMBER AND WILL CONFIRM HIS MOVEMENTS.

MR. PHILLIPS

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
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MR F T COPELAND CSC
R 812 RIVERWALK HOUSE

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CONFIDENTIAL & GUARD



Permanent Under-Secretary

DMB 17/xi

Near Eastern Department are in touch with the Overseas Police Adviser and with I.R.D. and hope to be able to find means of getting the Jordanians the advice they want.

2. It is unfortunately true that the Jordan Police Force has degenerated rather in recent years-largely, I think, because its senior officers have been lacking in the right qualifications and have been transferred and dismissed with a speed which must be devastating to morale. I hope that we shall be prepared before King Hussein gets to London (which now seems likely to be around the end of November) ^{with} ~~to have~~ some suggested remedies ~~ready~~.

3. I shall keep in touch with Near Eastern Department and report progress.

Philip Adams

(Philip Adams)
16 November, 1970.

NE Reg^r. pr ~~un~~ 26/4
EU & Papers please ~~un~~ 25/4

NEJ *PGH* 24/xi

CONFIDENTIAL & GUARD

Sir P. Adams.

CONFIDENTIAL GUARD

*I hope we can do something as this
both for domestic as well
as other reasons*

CYPHER CAT/A

PRIORITY AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 898

13 NOVEMBER 1970

DB 13/xi

CONFIDENTIAL 130915Z
GUARD.

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CONFIDENTIAL GUARD

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CONFIDENTIAL GUARD

AMMAN TELNO 898 TO FCO

- 3 -

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MR. PHILLIPS

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O.P.A.
ARABIAN D.
P.U.S.D.
DEFENCE D.
AMERICAN D.
F.T.A.D.

CONFIDENTIAL GUARD

Mr. Macoun

Thank you. I have noted para 1.
I kept a copy of this minute for
my file.

✓
Mr. C. W. Long (Near Eastern Department W132)

ending
" 23/11

Tel. sent

per cur

28/11

JORDAN


As you know, Sir Richard Catling called this morning and we discussed the request of the Jordan Government, as outlined in confidential telegram 898 of 13 November from Amman, in detail.

2. Sir Richard's reaction to the proposal that he should assist in advising the Jordan Government on the re-structuring of the Jordan Police Service was that he would like to help but suggested that, before committing himself, he should see King Hussein when he visits London.

3. Sir Richard expressed both admiration and sympathy for King Hussein and, although he had not met him before, he was deeply interested in the Jordan problem and in fact had known the King's father, Amir Abdullah, when he was King.

4. I have undertaken to keep Sir Richard informed as to when he would be likely to be required to see the King and have contact times and telephone numbers when required.

[Actually has
grandfather]



(M. J. Macoun)
Overseas Police Adviser
23 November, 1970.

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry No. W15

DEPARTMENT

CONFIDENTIAL AND GUARD

• Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s) _____

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

(Date) _____

24.11.70

25/11

~~Top Secret~~

~~Secret~~

~~Confidential~~

~~Unclassified~~

~~Flash~~

~~Immediate~~

~~Priority~~

Routine

Despatched _____

ROUTINE

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

[Security classification
—if any] _____

CONFIDENTIAL

24/11/40

[Privacy marking
—if any] _____

GUARD

En Clair.

Code

Cypher

[Codeword—if any] _____

Draft Telegram to:—

AMMAN

No. 573

(Date) 24/11

And to:—

Addressed to _____

AMMAN

telegram No. _____

(date) _____

24.11.70

And to _____

repeated for information to _____

Saving to _____

Repeat to:—

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Distribution:—

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NED: OPA,

PUSD:

DEFENCE D.

IRD.

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EXAMINED AT

12052

24/11

SIGNATURE _____

Your telegram No. 918: Police Adviser for Jordan.

We have spoken to Sir Richard Catling, who would in principle like to help. Before committing himself he would however like to discuss the task with King Hussein, in order to establish the measure of the problem, and what exactly would be required of him.

(repeat not)

2. We do not intend to present several candidates (plural) for the King to interview in London (see paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 553). We have instead provisionally selected the best candidate available. If Catling is not acceptable to the King, or alternatively does not think he can undertake the task, we could arrange for other candidates to be available for interview.

24/11

24/11

CONFIDENTIAL AND GUARD

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

NET 14/4
(6)

OWNER/CATA

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

ROUTINE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO AMMAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 573

24 NOVEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL. 241140Z.

per
26/4

GUARD.

(4)

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 918: POLICE ADVISER FOR JORDAN.

WE HAVE SPOKEN TO SIR RICHARD CATLING, WHO WOULD IN PRINCIPLE LIKE TO HELP. BEFORE COMMITTING HIMSELF HE WOULD HOWEVER LIKE TO DISCUSS THE TASK WITH KING HUSSEIN, IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH THE MEASURE OF THE PROBLEM, AND WHAT EXACTLY WOULD BE REQUIRED OF HIM.

2. WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT INTEND TO PRESENT SEVERAL CANDIDATES (PLURAL) FOR THE KING TO INTERVIEW IN LONDON (SEE PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TELEGRAM NO. 553). WE HAVE INSTEAD PROVISIONALLY SELECTED THE BEST CANDIDATE AVAILABLE. IF CATLING IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE KING, OR ALTERNATIVELY DOES NOT THINK HE CAN UNDERTAKE THE TASK, WE COULD ARRANGE FOR OTHER CANDIDATES TO BE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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C.P.A.
P.U.S.D.
DEFENCE D.
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CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

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Confidential

⑦ NED

NE Regs

PI p w trp

Amman 898

1. Nov 21/12 22/12

NE 14/4

Private Secretary

Police Adviser for Jordan

You may like to reassure the
Secretary of State that we are getting
on with this one (cf. his minute on
Amman Tel N° 898 below) — W ⑦
TOP COPY F ①

2. MoD have promised us
an answer on the possibility of
letting the King have some 105mm
Tank Ammunition by the end of this
week.

St Egerton

M^r C. Long

18/xi

CONFIDENTIAL GUARD

YPHER CAT/A

PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 898

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

13 NOVEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL 130915Z

GUARD.

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Tel ~~12/11~~ 12/11 16 11.

PRINCE HASSAN SUMMONED A MEMBER OF MY STAFF ON 6 NOVEMBER AND AFTER SAYING THAT HE SPOKE WITH THE KING'S EXPRESS AUTHORITY ASKED FOR H.M.G.'S URGENT ASSISTANCE IN BRINGING THE JORDAN POLICE FORCES UP TO A STATE COMMENSURATE WITH CURRENT PROBLEMS AND ESPECIALLY WITH THE NEED FOR THEM TO TAKE OVER CONTROL OF AMMAN. THE KING WAS MOST ANXIOUS TO SUBSTITUTE AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE POLICE METHODS FOR MILITARY ONES, BY WHICH HE EVIDENTLY MEANS PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF DISTURBANCES AND DISTURBERS OF THE PEACE BY MORE PATIENCE, SKILL AND MODERATE MEANS THAN THE ARMY HERE ARE TRAINED TO EMPLOY. UNFORTUNATELY THE EXISTING POLICE FORCE WERE STILL GEARED TO THE RELATIVELY PEACEFUL DAYS BEFORE JUNE 1967 AND NEEDED DRASTIC REFORM. ALTHOUGH THE KING HAD AT FIRST INTENDED TO SEEK AMERICAN ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE HE HAD ON REFLECTION DECIDED THAT BRITAIN'S LONG UNDERSTANDING WITH JORDAN AND GREATER EXPERIENCE OF OPERATIONS RANGING FROM MALAYA TO NORTHERN IRELAND MADE HER A BETTER SOURCE OF ADVICE. THE AMERICANS WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE ASKED TO HELP TECHNICALLY AND WITH SUPERVISION OF MATERIAL AID.

2. PRINCE HASSAN SAID THAT THE GREATEST PROBLEM WAS TO FIND COMPETENT OFFICERS FOR SENIOR POSITIONS. "COMFORTABLE OLD BARRIERS" FROM BEFORE 1967 COULD NOT COPE. FROM A REVIEW OF ALL OFFICERS INCLUDING RETIRED ONES IT APPEARED THAT THE RANK OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL WAS THE HIGHEST AT WHICH "LIVE WIRES" COULD BE FOUND AND TRAINED IN PROPER METHODS. THIS WAS OF COURSE A JORDANIAN PROBLEM BUT THE KING URGENTLY NEEDED SOUND BRITISH PROFESSIONAL ADVICE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL ON STRUCTURE, CHAIN OF COMMAND, MINISTERIAL POLICE POWERS AND DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY GENERALLY.

3. TO THIS END HE WOULD LIKE TO INVITE A SENIOR ADVISER TO BE CHOSEN AT AN APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL BY H.M.G. TO VISIT AMMAN PRIVATELY, LOOK OVER THE CITY, FAMILIARISE HIMSELF WITH ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSS SUITABLE MEASURES WITH THE KING AND OTHERS IN A POSITION TO PUT THEM INTO EFFECT. THE KING HOPED THAT THIS OFFICER COULD THEN PRIVATELY RECOMMEND TO HIM HOW THE FORCE SHOULD BE

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BE ORGANISED AND BY WHOM, AND ADVISE ON THE POSITION, TERMS OF REFERENCE AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF THOSE ENTRUSTED WITH THE TASK. THE SENIOR VISITOR SHOULD HIMSELF STAY AS LONG AS HE THOUGHT NECESSARY BUT ESSENTIALLY HIS VISIT WOULD BE A SHORT FACT-FINDING OPERATION TO PAVE THE WAY FOR REFORM AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, LEADING HE HOPED TO BRITISH HELP WITH TRAINING PROGRAMMES AT A LATER STAGE.

4. IT WAS MADE CLEAR THROUGHOUT THAT THE KING'S PURPOSE IN ALL THIS WAS TO INCULCATE MODERATION AND THE IDEA OF MINIMUM FORCE. THE HANDLING OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM AND METHODS OF ARMY/POLICE COOPERATION EVOLVED THERE AGAINST A POLITICAL BACKGROUND WERE REGARDED AS A GOOD BASIS FOR CONSIDERING HOW TO COPE WITH JORDAN'S PROBLEM. AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS CLEAR FROM PRINCE HASSAN'S COMMENTS THAT HE FELT THAT THE REPUTATION OF BRITISH POLICE FOR MODERATION WOULD IN ITSELF HELP, THROUGH THE REQUEST FOR RESIDENT ADVISERS, TO CREATE A PUBLIC IMPRESSION THAT FAIR PLAY WAS INTENDED BY THE GOVERNMENT.

5. I AM ENTIRELY IN FAVOUR OF HELPING THE KING TO GET A BETTER POLICE FORCE, SOMETHING BETWEEN THE EXISTING CIVIL POLICE WHO DISAPPEAR AS IF BY MAGIC AS SOON AS A CAR BACKFIRES, AND THE TRIGGER-HAPPY SOLDIERS WHO DO NOT WAIT TO FIRE BACK BUT SHOOT FIRST. AT THE SAME TIME, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE POLICE SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH THE FEDAYEEN MILITIA WITHOUT HAVING TO CALL IN THE ARMY (SOMETHING WHICH IS ANYHOW PRECLUDED BY THE TERMS OF THE CAIRO AND AMMAN AGREEMENTS); THIS COULD BE A SENSITIVE FIELD IN WHICH TO EMPLOY RESIDENT OUTSIDE ADVISERS. A CONDITION, THEREFORE OF GIVING OUR ADVICE AND, IT MAY BE, OF SUPERVISING ITS TRANSLATION INTO ACTION, SHOULD BE THE ABILITY (SINCE THE OPERATION IS BOUND TO BECOME KNOWN) TO GET IT ACROSS TO PALESTINIANS AS WELL AS OTHER ARABS ELSEWHERE THAT THE OBJECT OF THE EXERCISE IS TO MITIGATE UNNECESSARY "FEDAYEEN BASHING" RATHER THAN SIMPLY INCREASE POLICE EFFECTIVENESS IN DOING IT. ANOTHER POINT TO BEAR IN MIND IS THAT WHILE I SEE EVERY ADVANTAGE IN GENEROUS PROVISION BEING MADE FOR TRAINING JORDANIAN POLICE IN BRITAIN, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL THAT ANY ADVISERS WE PROVIDED TO WORK HERE WOULD HAVE TO BE OF A BACKGROUND AND STATURE WHICH WOULD MINIMISE THE RISK THAT THEY AND BRITAIN IN GENERAL WOULD BE BLAMED EVERY TIME A POLICEMAN USED EXCESSIVE FORCE (SOMETHING THAT HAPPENS IN LESS VOLATILE POPULATIONS THAN THE ARABS).

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- 3 -

6. THE FUTURE STABILITY OF THE COUNTRY WILL DEPEND CRITICALLY ON KEEPING THE ARMED FORCES OF BOTH SIDES APART AND THIS IMPLIES A STRONG AND EFFECTIVE POLICE FORCE TO HOLD THE RING. IT FOLLOWS THEREFORE THAT WHILE THE ABOVE ARE CONSIDERATIONS TO BE BORNE IN MIND BY OURSELVES AND BY WHOEVER MAY BE APPOINTED TO ADVISE, THEY ARE NOT AN ARGUMENT AGAINST HELPING OR FOR DELAY AND I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT URGENT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO A PRIVATE VISIT ON THE LINES REQUESTED. I SUGGEST THAT BOTH AS A GESTURE AND ALSO AS A PROPER USE OF SUCH MONIES WE MIGHT FINANCE IT FROM THE COUNTER-SUBVERSION FUND. AS TO THE PERSON OR PERSONS TO BE INVITED, IT OCCURS TO ME THAT IF HE WERE NOW FREE FROM HIS COMMITMENTS IN THE GULF SIR GAWAIN BELL, WHO HAS SERVED BOTH IN PALESTINE AND JORDAN BESIDES BEING A FLUENT ARABIST AND FRIEND OF THE FORMER AMIR ABDULLAH, MIGHT BE A GOOD CHOICE PROVIDED HE WERE ACCOMPANIED BY A HIGH-RANKING PROFESSIONAL POLICE OFFICER TO PROVIDE UP TO DATE TECHNICAL ADVICE.

MR. PHILLIPS

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NAE for file.

Police Advisor, Jordan

I have been in touch with Miss Panning
at the Jordan Embassy (937-8795)
who will arrange a call by Sir R.
Cuthing on King Hussein when the
letter is received. I have told Mr.

Macdonald & Mr Evans.

noted
22/12

Pl. Ltr & B.O. on

29/12/70

un

22/12

& Mr Macdonald

Spoken Miss Panning / King Hussein will
be in bed for another week

Pl. B.O. 5/1/71

un
29/12

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File.

LAST PAPER

Price advice: Jordan.

I confirmed with Miss Penning
 today that King Hussein does want
 to see Sir R. Cutting. She will
 telephone me again when a time
 can be fixed.

LAST PAPER

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b/1